The Government wanted to give the impression to both domestic and international audiences that its policies, such as the New Socialist Countryside and others initiatives meant to address social disparities, are working.
#Mps security code
A "disturbance of public order," however, is a legal term in China's criminal code that covers 37 offenses, including unsanctioned public assembly and obstruction of justice, among others. Nonetheless, a 2005 article on the website of the China Law Society (an official organization of Chinese legal scholars and professionals) argued that "mass incidents" have two main characteristics, namely 1) they involve large numbers of persons, from tens to hundreds and 2) about two-thirds of the incidents pit regular citizens against government authorities seen as failing to fulfill their official duties. The term "mass incident" has no legal definition. How security authorities differentiate a "disturbance of public order" from a "mass incident" remains unclear. In addition, an official Xinhua News Service report from 2005 pegged the number of "mass incidents" in 2003 at 60,000. The 87,000 "disturbances of public order" figure constituted an uptick over statistics leaked to outside sources in January 2005 indicating that the MPS tabulated some 74,000 "mass incidents" in 2004. The statements represented the first official reports in recent years of positive progress in reining in protests. The figure is confusing because in January of last year, the MPS stated that in 2005, there were some 87,000 "disturbances of public order" across the country by Chen's count, the number of "mass incidents" for 2005 would have been closer to 30,000. Also in January, Chen Xiwen, director of the Central Rural Work Leading Group, announced that the number of "mass incidents" nationwide fell by some 20 percent last year, to 23,000, adding that about half were in the countryside. At a press conference in January, MPS Vice Minister Liu Jinguo said the number of "mass incidents" in China declined by 16.5 percent in 2006. Releasing statistics about social disturbances has become a winter ritual of sorts for the Chinese Government. Reports and photographs of violent demonstrations in various places have given rise to analysis that “Beijing’s control over the coercive system, as well as that system’s capacity to maintain social control, appears to be slipping.” Since that assertion was published in 2001, Beijing has reinvigorated its coercive apparatus. Since the early 1990s, China has appeared precariously unstable various sources have noted mounting unrest - well over 100,000 “mass incidents” per year by 2001. The responsibilities and structure of public security agencies in China include: the prevention, suppression and investigations of criminal activities fight against terrorist activities maintenance of social security and order fight against behaviors jeopardizing social order control over traffic, fire and dangerous objects administration of household registration, identification cards, nationality, exit-and-entry, stay and travel of foreigners in China maintenance of border security protection of state assigned persons, venues and facilities management of gatherings, parades and demonstrations security inspection on public information networks supervision and instruction of security work in state organizations, mass organizations, enterprises and important construction sites and instruction of crime prevention work of community security commissions. According to press reports, State Council budget figures for 20 - even if not broken out by agency - show that the expenditures on internal security systems have outpaced the cost of China’s dramatic military modernization, coming in at $95 billion compared to $92 billion in 2010 and up to $111 billion for 2012. This makes these services not just part of a policy staff process but an integral tool for the preservation of the power of the Chinese Communist Party (CCP). The distinction between intelligence and internal security policy is minimal, institutionally speaking.
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